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EDITOR'S BRIEF
In this edition of the Colonial Lawyer, the staff has
attempted to address several issues that are on the forefront of
state and national legal and social debate. The article concerning the Chesapeake Bay stresses the importance man has played in
the decay of that estuary and the role we must all play in its
resurrection.
Greg Tolbert's article addresses the issue of marital rape.
The article is the second in a two-part series. In 1986 Virginia
amended its code, abandoned the common law marital rape exemption
and statutorily prohibited marital rape.
The article examines
the new law and analyzes its purpose, scope and limitations.
Another current debate in Virginia centers around water rights
and uses. Sherri Davis and Bruce McDougal suggest that reform is
necessary.
Gary Close's article centers on a current crisis in zoning
law as it affects churches and other religions organizations.
This topic is of great debate in both Fairfax and Henrico
counties in Virginia. The article analyzes the zoning law and
suggests the analysis courts should apply when confronted with
free exercise arguments offered by churches and religious
organizations. The last article in this isse is a short commentary by Dale Barney emphasizing the need of a small-claims court
in Virginia.
We, the staff of the Colonial Lawyer, welcome your comments
and sincerely hope that this issue will alert our readers to the
most current legal issues in Virginia and the nation.

~~~

~. ~hompson

Cravens
Senior Editor
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THB TIMELBSS BBAUTY OP THB CHESAPEAKE BAY:
WILL OUR GENERATION DBSTROY THIS REMARKABLE ESTUARY?
Joe Cravens*
VIRGINIANS, sound the alarm! Citizens of this nation pay heed. One of
our nation's and surely Virginia's, most valuable resources is on the brink
of destruction. Our state's magnificent and productive natural estuary, the
Chesapeake Bay, is dying. Man, in all his grandeur, is responsible. For
years, the unfettered drainage and dumping of chemical wastes, sewage, and
agriculture fertilizers into the more than one hundred and fifty rivers,
creeks, and streams which feed the Bay has limited the estuary's ability to
cleanse itself.
It is now in the hands of humans to attempt to reverse
this course. If immediate steps are not taken to rehabilitate both the Bay
and its tributaries, this marvelous body of water will become nothing more
than an exhausted, polluted, dead natural resource laid waste by human
development. 1
The day has come for man to both realize and react to his impact upon
the fragile environment surrounding him. Lord Byron said it best almost two
centuries ago when inspired by the "austere grandeur" of the Swiss Alps on a
visit in 1816:
How beautiful is all this visible world!
How glorious in its action and itself!
But we, who name ourselves its sovereign, we,
Half dust, half deity, alike unfit
To sink or soar, with our mixed essence make
A conflict of its elements, and breath
The breath of degradation and of pride.
Contending with low wants and lofty will,
Till our mortality predominates. 2
Concern has arisen recently over the complex ecosystem of our Bay. It is
the largest and most productive estuary in the United States, providing food
and a hub of commerce to Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania since colonial
times. The living resources of the bay constitute a vital part of the
United States fishing industry. Unfortunately the Bay's seafood harvest has
been declining steadily during the past several years due primarily to the
*Joe Cravens is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe, Sr. Editor of the
Colonial Lawyer, and a member of the William and Mary National Moot Court
Team. His last article in the Colonial Lawyer, which he co-authored, ~
the Minor's Right: The Minor's Abortion Decision in Virginia, was cited in
the "Worth Reading" column of the November 24, 1986 edition of the National
Law Journal.
1 See Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 5, 1984, at B15, Col. 1; see also
Marjorie Hutler, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOORCES L. at 185, 1984-85.
2 George Gordon, Lord Byron - Manfred: "A dramatic poem" referred to
Byron as "a drama of ideas." It is with hunble intentions that we, the
staff of the Colonial Lawver, inspired by the great blue waters of the
Chesapeake Bay, endeavor to write; that "she" may be saved - for us - and
posterity.

by
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deteriorating water quality of the Bay.3 The Bay and its tributaries are il
the midst of the megalopolis that stretches from Boston to Richmond. II
is not surprising that this carefully balanced system should be disturbed b~
the impact of intense and steadily increasing human activity.4 The Bay cal
be saved 1 however, to do so will require the prudent decisions of statE
legislatures and local governments across the eastern seaboard. Concertec
efforts must be made at all levels to effectively inhibit the ability oj
pollutants to enter tributaries flowing to the Bay.
I. Problems Created by Bay Pollution
Pollutants which flow from tributaries and enter the Bay are not
quickly dispersed or absorbed by its waters and flushed into the vast
Atlantic Ocean. The circulation patterns in the Bay are unique, both ir
flowing fresh water and in-flowing ocean water. These conditions, whict
make Bay ecosystems some of the most biologically productive on earth, alse
act to hold within the estuary the pollutants that reach the Bay by tributaries. 5 These pollutants have accumulated over the years and now are
acting to gradually destroy the productive nature of the waters. Overenrichment with nutrients (phosphorus and nitrogen), contamination by
toxics, and a rapid decline in the amount of submerged aquatic vegetation
(SAV) in the Bay are all a result of the pollution. 6 Another problerr
involves the large areas of the Chesapeake Bay which have low or no dissolved oxygen (DO). Between 1950 and 1980, the size of these areas increased by
The extent of the DO problem is evidenced by
a multiple of fifteen.
the fact that nfrom May through September [1983] in an area reaching from
the Annapolis Bay Bridge to the Rappahannock River, much of the water deeper
than 40 feet has no oxygen and, therefore, is devoid of life. n7
Can we as Virginians comprehend the magnitude of a Bay devoid of life?
If this continues, if this trend is not immediately put to a halt, we could
be faced with this de~astating reality, and in our lifetime. The famed
seaman Jacques Cousteau has warned such and pointed to the example of the
Mediterranean Sea. This cannot be allowed to occur. If we fail to take
both preventive and corrective (rehabilitative action)1 we may soon only
remember those world renowned Chesapeake Bay Blue Point Oysters or the
succulent blue and soft shell crabs, or Bay scallops. Already we have seen
the striped bass population, the fish that at one time was the Bay's
mainstay, eroded to levels such that the species now requires govern3 Warren and Kindt, Land-Based Pollution and the Chesapeak Bay, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1985).
4 Eichbaum, Cleaning
10238 (1984).

Up

the Chesapeake Bay, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10237,

5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM:
FINDIN;S AND REXl)MMENDATIONS 19 (1983).
6 Eichbaum, ~ note 4, at 10239.
7 Warner & Kindt, supra note 3, at 1111, citing EPA Chesapeake Bay
Findings, supra note 5, at 22.
3

mental protection. The loss of these species will mean more than the mere
loss of dietary delicacies. The pollution of the Bay and the decline in
submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) may have even more devastating effects on
the nation's ecology.
Twenty species of SAV occur in the Bay, in water less than three meters
deep. SAV stabilizes sediments, baffles current, reduces shore erosion,
buffers against nutrient runoff, and serves as food for aquatic species and
waterfowl. SAV zones provide some of the most favorable habitat in the
Bay.8 The Bay is one of the flyway routes for Canada Geese, ducks and
many other northern waterfowl. Quite possibly, this complex ecosystem could
become so polluted that these transient birds will no longer survive the
southern flight because of Bay pollution. These beautiful creatures could
be forced to reroute natural flyways because of lack of food and clean water
in the Bay region. The ramifications of a dead Bay are too astounding to
calculate. Our only choice is to band together as a state and as a nation
and save this resource from destruction.
II.

Pollution Control Proposals

In 1976 the EPA began a five year project to research, study and
identify the ecological problems threatening the fragile ecosystem of the
Bay. Completed in 1981, the studies resulted in a practical set of recommendations. The final product of research and recommendations were five
written essays, and they form the basis of most of the knowledge we have
today about pollution of the Bay, the sources of that pollution, and its
effects upon the Bay.9
In the efforts to save the Chesapeake Bay, pollution controls must be
implemented in several ,specific areas: 1) sewage treatment, 2) industrial
pollution/waste product discharges, 3) reduction of non-point source
agriculture pollution and 4) pollution limitation of industrial toxic waste
disposal. lO If measures in these areas are not successfully undertaken, the
environmental threshold could be crossed. Crossing this threshold - where
8 Hutter, supra note 1, at 223 n. 27, citing Citizens Program for
Chesapeake Bay, CHOICES FOR THE CHESAPEAKE: AN ACTION AGENDA 60 (October
1983) (workshop recommendations to the December 1983 conference) at 6.
9 ~ sUPra note 5, U.S. Envirorane,1tal Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE
BAY PROORAM TEX:HNICAL S'ruDIES: A SYNI'HESIS (1982) (a Slml!ary of the technical knowledge gained from numerous research projects concerning particular
problems). U.S. Enviroranental Protection Agency, CHESAPEARE BAY: INl'ROOOCTION TO AN ECOSYSTEM (1982) (a description of the ecological systems of the
Bay and the components which make up its complex ecosystem and the relationship of those components.) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY ECOSYSTEM]. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAME.W)RK FOR ACTION
(1983) (a description of current conditions in the Bay and recommendations
for the future restoration of the estuary) [hereinafter A F~RK FOR
ACTION]. U.S. Enviroranental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A PROFIT.E
OF ENVIRONMENl'AL CHANGE (1983) (slml!arizing the past and present character
of the Bay) [hereinafter A PROFILE OF CHAN:>E] •
10
are not
however
current

Eichbaum, supra note 4, at 10241. Efforts to rehabilitate the bay
restricted to these areas. These are the areas of greatest concern
because these several areas constitute the major portion of the
threat to the Chesapeake Bay.
4

water quality moves just below that point which allows the survival of basic
species - would bring death to most living organisms in the Bay.
BecausE
of the unique circulation of the Bay's waters - once this threshold iE
reached - the Bay will not quickly flush itself. Because of this severell
limited assimilative capacity and "irreversible despoilation as the probablE
result nll of crossing the environmental threshold, we as Virginians must
work now to cleanse our waters, our life's blood.
A. Sewage Treatment
It is essential that states whose municipal sewage treatment plante
drain into the tributaries flowing to the Bay impose more stringent regulations on those municipal treatment plants to remove excess nutrients. wastewater treatment techniques currently employed by many municipalities across
the east coast, but especially in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia, fail to remove many pollutants, particularlyphosphorus. These
pollutants are discharged in massive quantities into the upper Bay.12
The magnitude and impact of sewage waste water on the Bay is illustrated by the fact that "[o]ver 1,000 sewage treatment plants are located on the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. n13 Each day they contribute more than
one and a half billion gallons of treated wastewater to our rivers and
streams and [ultimately] to the Bay.14 As large as the Bay is, these
numbers are astounding. They are astounding even if we assume that all of
the wastewater reaching the Bay has been properly treated, but this is not
always the case. Wastewater pumped into rivers and streams nfrequently does
not meet the requirements established by the government, even when those
requirements are lax, as they often are. n15 This is unacceptable! To
resolve the crisis facing the Bay, much more must be done. If the Bay is
inadequately assimilating the pollutants reaching it today - what will occur
with development and increased sewage demands? If we know that the future
will require greater amounts of wastewater to be dumped into the Bay and its
tributaries, logic requires us to demand now treatment that will greatly
reduce the amount of pollutants present in the dischargeable wastewater.
For years, many people believed that the Bay had an unlimited capacity
to assimilate hUman wastes. n16
Now we know this is not true. states have
begun to take action, but we, as concerned citizens, must insure that
legislation equates to compliance, which is often not the case with regard
to environmental protection legislation. Our government has been far to lax
in punishment and enforcement efforts. Penalties must be established that
11 Warner

&

Kindt,

§.YI2m

note 3, at 1102.

12 ~ EichbalUll, supra note 4, at 10241.
13 A. Powers, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE:

KEY ProBLEMS 12 (1985).

14 Id.
15 Id.
16 ~

§.YI2m

note 5, at 19.
5

will convey to polluters the severity and consequences of continued misuses
of the environment.
Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia have
begun unified action,17 but citizens must press for further Bay relief
programs. with regard to the Chesapeake Bay, there is no room for mistake,
there is no place for mismanagement, and there is no time for delay. It is
clear that much of what will occur to end the pollution of our rivers and
streams will occur at the local and state level. 18 Thus, small groups of
concerned citizens can have a real impact on how local governments and
city planning commissions approach and manage the problem of sewage treatment in their respective communities. Federal and state standards exist,
but these are the minimal requirements. Communities should push themselves
not to meet the standards, but to exceed these standards and by as much as
possible. When we as a people begin to confront problems with this attitude, maybe, just maybe, immediate and substantial progress can be made.
There has been proposed federal legislation that could greatly enhance
the ability of state and local government to fund intensified pollution
control measures.
On January 3, 1985, Maryland Representative Ray Dyson
introduced Chesapeake Bay Legislation. 19 This bill would amend the Clean
Water Act to authorize EPA to disburse ten million dollars a year in
matching grants to states, through fiscal year 1989, to implement the
interstate management plans developed pursuant to the "Chesapeake Bay
Agreement."20
The amendments would also authorize three million dollars
annually for the states to study point source and nonpoint source discharges into the Bay.2l Funding for virtually any project is a source of
17 The District of Columbia has established a policy that will
control urban runoff as well as concomitant sewer overflows by 1989.
Maryland allocated over $70 million to the cleanup effort by authorizing:
(1) the establishment of a comprehensive storm water mangement program, (2)
an improved and upgraded system of treatment plants, and (3) a program to
preserve land adjacent to tributaries. Virginia's 2 year contribution
towards cleaning up the Bay was 13.3 million.
the plan was directed at
controlling point source pollution, identifyin conconcentrations of orgamicides and toxic metals, and providing controls on nonpoint source pollution
caused by botha griculture and urban runoff. Pennsylvania established a
plan for the susquehanna River to curb the entrance of phosphates, from
treated sewage discharges, and reduce the level of nutrients in washwater
after treatment. These controls to limit pollutants in the Susquehanna are
important because the river cosntitutes the larges source of freshwater
entering the Bay. Warner, ~ note 3, at 1122, 23.
18 See Flynn, The Critical Role of the States, 55 J. WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL FED'N 1224 (1983): and J. CAPPER, G. POWER & F.R. SHIVERS, JR. CHESAPEAKE WATERS 12 (1983).
19

H.R. 9, 99th Congo 1st Sess. (1985).

20 The Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983 was a result of a conference
of the Governors of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, the Mayor of
Washington D.C. , and the Administrator of the EPA.
Each member proposed
an haction agenda" which was to be implemented in a "joint initiative" to
~ave the Chesapeak Bay.
The text of the agrements is printed in, Citizens
Program for the Chesapeake Bay, CHOICES FOR THE CHESAPEAKE:
AN ACTION
AGENDA 6, 17 (1984).
21

Hutter, supra note 8, at 194.
6

great debate in the American political process, especially at the local
level where even small projects
Therefore any federal assistance,
to alleviate some of the burden
decide whether the implementation
is possible.

have the potential to strain the budget.
such as matching funds, would surely help
facing local planners when attempting to
of heightened pollution control measures

If multistate cooperation is to succeed in controlling point source
pollution of the Bay and its tributaries, local authorities must exercise
their enforcement authority.
No longer can violators be tolerated.
Ironically, those communities in Virginia most concerned with the continued
health and survival of the Chesapeake Bay are the communities whose sewer
systems and inadequate sewage treatment plants are major Bay polluters. 22
The inflow of urban rainwater runoff into sewer lines causes the capacity of
sewage treatment plants located on the James River near Newport News,
Hampton Roads, and Cape Charles, Virginia to often be exceeded.
Those
plants are then forced to discharge wastewater containing high levels of nutrients, bacteria, and sewage solids directly into the James. 23
In the
entire Bay region, this sewage problem is most serious in communities on the
lower James in Virginia.
Something must
be done. Virginians must help
themselves before seeking assistance from others. We must lead this charge
by example. The battle has begun and the intolerable discharge of pollutant
filled wastewater into the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries must end. It
must end in New York.
It must end in Pennsylvania.
It must end in the
District of Columbia. It must end in Maryland, and certainly it must end in
our own backyard.
America is a nation founded with citizen action led by
Virginians, and it would be a grave mistake to tarnish that heritage by the
failure of Virginians to fulfill their obligation to state and country
today.
B. Industrial Compliance
Our government must insure that industrial compliance with the Clean
Water Act 24 is fact rather than fiction. We as citizens of this Commonwealth have the legal right to protect our environment; with respect to
industrial polluters, it is imperative that we exercise these rights. In a
recent decision in Virginia, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Virginia was sued by
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, a citizens environmental organization. 25
22 See Commonwealth of Virginia Council on Environment, Water Control
Bd., Soi & Water Conservation Comm'n and Dep't of Marine Resources, Virginia
Chesapeak Bay Initiatives, 1984-86 (Apr. 30, 1984) (a table of Virginia
General Assembly Appropriations) •
23 Hutter, ~ note 8, at 203 n. 128, citing Virginia Bay Initiatives, ~ note 22, at C-2 (emphasis added) •
24

33 U.S.C. §§125l (1982).

25 611 F.Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985)
The suit was authorized by
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365, as a "Citizen suit" to
enforce compliance with federal law.
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A federal judge fined Gwaltney a total of $1,285,322. 26 This award was
affirmed by the United states Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 27
This decision illustrates that private citizens and citizen organizations
can playa major role in the protection of our precious environment.
In
Mary~and, Chesapeake Bay Foundation suits have spurred the state officials
to double the number of personnel assigned to industrial compliance.
Actions filed by the state have increased dramatically.28 If anything,
citizen awareness has spurred the state to take important action.
C. Reduction of Non-Point Source Agriculture Pollution
For years, the farming community failed to comprehend the devastating
effects its land use practices had on Virginia's waters. The practice of
cUltivation of highly erodable soils dramatically increases the amount of
sediment that reaches the Bay.
The improvident use of fertilizers and
pesticides also pollute our waterways with excessive amounts of nutrients,
especially nitrogen, and toxics. Agricultural practices have significantly
contributed to the decline of the Bay.29 The increase in nutrients stimulates growth of algae and phytoplankton and prevents the dissolution of
oxygen. 30 The lack of oxygen affects the survival of fish indigenous to the
estuary, and will if not controlled, prevent the populations from ever
returning.
For successful changes to be undertaken, state agriculture and conservationists must convince farmers that the containment of erosion problems
are in the best interest of both the community and the farmer. The first
problem with this approach is that the technical resources for advising
farmers as to how to reduce runoff pollution and erosion have not been
available at the soil conservation district level. 3l The major problem
however is that too little financial assistance has been made available to
farmers to induce them to correct certain agricultural practices. Their
livelihood is farming, and it is understandable that they irrigate wherever
practicable and fertilize to get the most from each crop. The solution lies
with more money and technical advice. We as a society should fund these
projects because we are not blameless with respect to agricultural pollution. We cannot expect farmers to bear the burden of the cost of Bay
cleanup.
Incentive payments and matching grants to help farmers control
erosion and runoff could benefit everyone. The Bay study, A Framework For
26

lQ., at 1565 (Merhige, D.J.).

27 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986).
28

A. POWERS,

~

note 13, at 13.

29 Lindon & Gergen, Interagency Disputes Over Dry Fields or Clean
Water: A Case Study of the Conflict Between Agricultural Drainage Programs
and the Chesapeake Bay Cleanup, 4 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCES L.2l9, 221
(1985)
30
31

Eichbaum,

~

note 4, at 10243.
8

Action, found that runoff from cropland and other non-point sources is the
major source of nitrogen to the nutrient enriched areas of the Bay.32 The
evidence clearly establishes that these farming practices must be eliminated, and they can.
They cannot be eliminated, however, if we choose not to
spend the money necessary to bring about meaningful change.
D. Limitation of Industrial Toxic waste Disposal
Throughout the industrial revolution, America permitted industrial
growth and advancement at both the expense of human and environmental
health. With the New Deal in the 1930s our government began taking specific
steps to restrict industrial exploitation of the work force.
It was not
until years later that sUbstantive steps were taken to attempt to restrict
industrial exploitation of our environment.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 33 announced
a federal presence in efforts to restore and maintain the "biological integrity of the nations waters" by developing technology necessary to eliminate
the discharge of pollutants into those waters. 34 The 1977 Clean Water Act 35
significantly amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972. The Clean Water Act implemented an entirely new federal strategy for
the control of toxics and the discharge of these materials into the nations
waters, EPA "Best Available Technology Toxics", to be regulated by permits. 36 The state of Virginia under the authority of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program 37 assumed control of the
permit system in 1975 after the State Water Control 1aw38 was amended to
give authority to the State Water Control Board to enforce the federal and
state regulations.
Under the Act, States have the authority to establish
standards more stringent than EPA 1imitations. 39 Virginia has been reluctant to develop new and independent limitations regarding the discharge of
toxic wastes into industrial waste streams and has been lax in enforcing
existing standards.
32 Lindon & Gergen, ~ note
ACTION, supra note 9, at 61. Non-point
the total nitrogen load to the Bay in a
contributes 60-75 percent of that total
33

29, at 221, citing A FRAMEWORK FOR
source po11utsants contribute 67% of
year of average rainfall. Farmland
figure.

33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1982).

34 Watson, Point Source Water Quality Control in Virginia:
for the Chesapeake, 4 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCES L. 263, 275 (1985).
35

Choices

Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.

36 LQ. at 53, 91 Stat. at 1589 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1317 (1982».
Best Available Technology (BAT) apply to entities discharging "priority
toxic pollutants" of which there are 126. These pollutants are defined in
NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.DC 1976).
See Watson, ~ note 34, at
277 n. 88.
37
(1982) •

Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments (1972), 33 U.S.C. §1342

38

VA. CODE ANN. §62.1-44.15(5)

39

Watson,

~

(1982).

note 34, at 282.
9

The Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA in 1984 to review the
Virginia NPDES program charging that the water Control Board was administratively continuing industrial and municipal permits. The state Water Control
Board must strictly monitor all recipients of permits if the Bay is to be
saved. Dilatorious administrative continuance of permits defies the entire
process and minimizes the effect of legislation which is already years
late.
This intolerable defiance cannot be permitted, even if it means
federal overseers doing spotchecks at permit sites on a daily basis.
Virginia cannot permit the few offenders to spoil the Chesapeake Bay for us
all.

III. Current Crisis
On Thursday, November 6, 1986, President Reagan vetoed an $18 biliion
extension of the clean water act. This veto if not overridden by Congress,
could have placed a padlock on that treasure chest of natures bounty we call
the Chesapeak Bay.
Without adequate funding, adequate protection programs will not exist.
Without these programs, the timeless beauty of the seven hundred miles of
shoreline along the bay could cease to be timeless. Congress must address
the actions of the President and Virginias must assert the necessity of
saving the Bay.
An $18 billion dollar expenditure to save the nations
waters is long overdue. Local governments accross the United states are
dependant upon those federal dollars to improve sewer systems that are in
need of repair and rehabilitation.
Every American should realize just how much this money means to our
health and future.
The extension of the 1972 Clean Water Act will most
likely be reintroduced in January of 1987 by senator Daniel P. Moynihan,
a Democrat from New York, who is in line to become the Chairman of the
Environment Subcommittee on water resources in the new Congress. With
public support, this time the legislation could be successful. We as
Virginians must act to provide that necessary support.
Conclusion
If we as a society are to continue to enjoy the fruits of this precious
earth on which we live, it is imperative that we act in concert to preserve
and repair the elements that our lives wreak havock upon.
The problems
which face our state in preserving the Chesapeake Bay, though national in
character, can and must be addressed at the state and local level. This
means that the private citizen or groups of concerned citizens can and must
make their feelings known. They must utilize their voices and their votes
to
force state and local political leaders to address this important
environmental issue.
The preservation of the Chesapeake Bay is not a
political issue nor a party issue. The magnitude and importance of the
Chesapeake Bay to Virginia and the world transcends political bounds. Each
and every living being on this planet today and those which will reside on
the earth in the futUre are concerned parties. The problems can be solved,
10

but they will only be solved if states and localities begin to implement
pollution control standards that exceed minimal requirements. Each state,
each locality, bears the burden of doing everything within the bounds of
reason to reduce the level of pollutants that enter the rivers and streams
of this great state. When we reach this level of social awareness, we will
have reached the point at which the Chesapeake Bay can begin a rebirth.
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WA'l'ER RIGB'fS LAW IN VIRGINIA:
YIIIB POR RBPORII?

Bruce McDouga1*
Sherri L. Davis**
Virginia, as an historically rural and agrarian state in the
humid East, has only recently been forced to face the legal and
institutional issues involved in managing and allocating water, a
finite natural resource.
Laws which have altered the basic
common law principles governing water rights have been passed in
response to rapid urban growth in Northern and Southeastern
Virginia, several recent droughts in the state, and intergovernmental conflicts arising from localities' refusal to share their
access to water resources.
For the most part, Virginia enacted
water rights legislation in the aftermath of water crises, and
subsequently has been interpreted and adapted so that it has
little effect on the underlying problems which it was meant to
address.
This article will outline virginia's common law of water
rights, which is applicable to most of the state, discuss
statutory law in its current state, anQ discuss the possibility
of future legislative proposals.
water rights in Virginia, absent statutory law, are governed
exclusively by the common law; thus the only enforcement mechanism is the private 1awsuit. 1
The courts have retained the
historic common law distinction between surface water and
groundwater rights.
Surface water rights in streamflow are called riparian
rights, while those in lakes are littoral rights. These two
surface water rights doctrines are basically the same, but
conflicts more often arise in connection with riparian rights.
Riparian rights are incident to the ownership of land bordering
or crossed by a stream. 2 However, "riparian land is ••• 1imited in
*Bruce McDougal is a 1st year law student at Marshall-Wythe and
the Managing Editor of the Colonial Lawyer.
**Sherri L. Davis is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe and
Research Editor of the Colonial Lawyer. Her previous article in
the Colonial Layer, on marital rape, was reprinted in the
virginia Gazette.
1 For several more detailed discussions of the common law
governing water rights in Virginia, see W.E. Cox, Water Supply
Management in Virginia, 61 Institute of Government Newsletter,
57 (1985); L.L. Butler, Defining Public Consumptive Rights in
Virginia's Rivers. streams. and Lakes:
Is Legislative Reform
Needed? VA. B.A.J. 14 (1985); W.E. Cox and L. A. Shabman,
Institutional Issues Affecting Water Supply Development:
Illustrations from Southeastern virginia, Virginia Water Resources Research Center Annual Allotment Project A-076 (1982).
2 Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 521, 19 S.E.2d
700, 702 (1942).
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its extent by the watershed of the stream; in other words, lands
beyond the watershed cannot be regarded as riparian, though part
of a single tract, held in a common ownership, which borders on
the stream."3 As a further restriction, only those parcels which
are owned by one person, acquired in one transaction, and
bordering a stream are riparian to that stream. 4
A riparian landowner's use of water must be for the benefit
of the riparian land and the use must be reasonable. BReasonable
use" is defined in the context of the needs of all other riparian
landowners:
"A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the
water of the stream in connection with his riparian estate and
for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he leaves the
current diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard
for the like right to enjoy the common property of other riparian
owners. n5 Historically, there has been a hierarchy of reasonable
uses:
First, the primary use is for natural and domestic
purposes, in order to supply the wants of man and
animal, and each owner of the land, through or by which
the stream flows, is at liberty to take as much as may
be necessary for these purposes, even if it be thereby
entirely consumed in the use. Second, he may also use
the same for agricultural purposes such as irrigation,
and for manufacturing purposes, but for these purposes
he shall use the same in a reasonable manner, so as not
to destroy or render useless or materially diminish the
flow, so as to affect the application of the water by
the riparian proprietors below, and if ••• he temporarily
diverts a part of the stream, ,Fe must cause same to be
returned to the channel below.
Virginia ascribes to the reasonable use theory, whereby -in
an action for damages or suit for injunction by a lower against
an upper riparian landowner for wrongful diversion of water by
the latter, ••• the plaintiff in order to prevail must show some
substantial actual damage occasioned by the diminution of the
quantity of the water which the plaintiff has the right to use."7
"The only question is whether there is actual injury to the lower
estate for any present or future reasonable use. The diversion
alone, without evidence of such damage, does not warrant a
3 Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 551, 106
S.E. 508, 511 (1921).
4

19. at 553, 106 S.E. at 512.

5 Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover., 143 Va. 460, 467, 130
S.E. 408, 410 (1925), citing Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School,
216 Mass. 83, 85, 103 N.E. 87,89 (1913).
6 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10 Va. L. reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904).
7 Town of Gordonsville, 129 Va. at 560, 106 S.E. at 514.
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recovery even of nominal damages. a8
Riparian rights are separable from the underlying land and
may be conveyed through sale,9 condemnation,lO or prescription. ll
It is a well settled doctrine that there may be a conveyance of
water or water rights separate and apart from the land thereunder, and that such a conveyance is a conveyance of a property
right. 12 These separable riparian rights can only be used in
conformance with the reasonable use doctrine; however one
Virginia case indicates that diversion to non-riparian land is
aan extraordinary and not a reasonable use. n13
Rights in groundwater can take two forms: absolute ownership or reasonable use. The Virginia Supreme Court has not
indicated which doctrine prevails in Virginia: in Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v. Compton,14 the court discussed both forms of ownership, and finally refused to take a position, as the defendants'
use of the land in coal mining operations qualified as either
type of ownership.
The court said:
[T]he fee-simple owner of the land [is] the owner of
everything above and below the earth, expressed in the
maxim, [cllajus est solum, ~ est usgue QQ coelum et
ad inferos ••• This doctrine allows a landowner to make
any use he pleases of underlying percolating waters; he
may even cut l~em off maliciously without liability to
his neighbor.
Of reasonable use the court said:
The nreasonable usen rule does not forbid the use of
percolating water for all purposes properly connected
with the use, enjoyment, and development of the land
itself, but it does forbid maliciously cutting it off,
its unnecessary waste, or withdrawal for sale or
distribution for uses not connected with the ~gneficial
enjoyment of the land from which it is taken.
This definition of reasonable use allows any use beneficial
to the land; this differs from the definition of reasonable use
of surface water, which compares on riparian user to all others
8 virginia Bot Springs Co., 143 Va. at 467.
note 5.

See also supra

9 Bite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 224, 8 S.E.2d 369, 371
(1940) •
10 Potts, 179 Va. at 525, 19 S.E.2d at 704.
11 Town of Gordonsville, 129 Va. at 560, 106 S·.E. at 514.
12 Thurston v. Town of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 913, 140
S.E.2d 678, 681 (1965); Bite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. at 224, 8
S.E.2d at 37l.
13 Potts, 179 Va. at 521, 19 S.E.2d at 704.
14 148 Va. 437, 454, 139 S.E. 308, 313 (1927).

15 Id. at 451, 139 S.E. at 313.
16 19. at 452, 139 S.E. at 313.
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using the same source.
Although the common law has governed water rights in the
Commonwealth since the colonial period, the various doctrines
continue {o be refined, clarified and adapted to meet contemporary needs.
This has created both confusion and an unusual
opportunity for creative advocates to shape the primary body of
law relating to Virginia water rights.
Virginia's present statutory system of groundwater control
is codified in Code of Virginia sections 62.1-44.83 ~ ~, the
Groundwater Act of 1973.
It provides that any area declared by
the state water Control Board to be a "groundwater management
area" is subject to the provisions outlined in the Act. Only two
areas were declared in 1973 to be "groundwater management
southeastern Virginia, south of the James River,
including the counties of Prince George, Sussex, Southampton,
Surry, Isle of Wight, and the cities of Norfolk and Virginia
Beach1 and the Eastern Shore of Virginia. Any locality or the
State Board itself may initiate proceedings to have any area of
the state declared a "gr.oundwater management area", however, no
additional areas have been established since 1973.
Generally, the Act requires a user to obtain a permie for
withdrawal of groundwater or an increase in groundwater use, and
the State Water Control Board approves or disapproves increased
use based on statutory criteria specified in the Act.
Initially, the Act was criticized for its broad exemptions
from the permitting system, which included agricultural uses, use
for human consumption or domestic purposes, and certain industrial and commercial uses. 17
These exemptions, coupled with an
opinion of the Attorney General, which stated that withdrawal of
water by municipalities for mixed domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes falls within the exempted use category,
rendered the Act virtually ineffective in controlling groundwater
use within the "groundwater management area."
In the last session of the General Assembly, it was proposed
that all categorical exemptions be eliminated and that a very
narrow general exemption for water withdrawals of less than
10,000 gallons a day be imposed.1 8
The agricultural lobby
opposed the elimination of the agricultural use exemption, thus,
the legislature retained the exemption, with the condition that
agricultural users of more than 300,000 gallons per month ~ be
required to report the amount of their withdrawals.
Subsequently, the General Assembly passed a resolution
giving agricultural water use reporting responsibilities to local
Virginia Tech Extension Service agents.
The bill's proposed
17 VA. CODE ANN. §62.l-44.87, (19
18 H. 561 1986 Sess.
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).

10,000 gallons per day use limitation for exemption from permit
requirements was amended before passage, to 300,000 gallons per
month, and an exemption was added for uses by groundwater heat
pumps, which fall under a separate permit requirement of Virginia
Water Control Law. Thus, the amended section reads:
No certificate of groundwater right, permit or registration statement ••• shall be required for any water
withdrawal of less than 300,000 gallons a month or for
groundwater withdrawn for agricultural or livestock
purposes....
[T]he Board may be regulation require
persons in any groundwater management area who withdraw
more than 300,000 gallons of water per month for
agricultural and livestock purposes to report the
amount of such withdrawal. Nor shall any certificate
of groundwater right, permit or registration statement
be required for the withdrawal of groundwater for use
by a groundwater heat ~9rP for which a permit has been
issued by the Board ••••
The effect of this 1986 amendment is to eliminate the
exemption of municipalities from permit requirements, its
effectiveness in increasing state control over conflicts arising
from use of limited groundwater in the southeastern portion of
the state has yet to be seen.
The 1986 Session of the General assembly also enacted the
Private Well Construction Act,20 which generally requires
application for and receipt of a permit from the state Department
of Health prior to construction of any well in the Commonwealth.
Thus, the role of the state in groundwater management
remains limited in areas of the state not declared "groundwater
management areas." In the majority of counties of the state, the
common law governs allowable withdrawal of groundwater.
Legislative reform of water rights in Virginia is desperately needed, yet the General Assembly has not been able to effect a
workable solution to water allocation problems, which become more
acute with each drought that the state suffers. Legislators from
the eastern portion of the state, which has been hit most hard by
recent droughts, are eager to implement some type of permitting
or other allocation system. On the other hand, legislators from
the western part of the state do not perceive the problem as one
which requires an immediate solution.
This legislative standstill has prompted the State Water
Control Board to introduce bills to the General Assembly over the
past several years. Prior to the 1986 session of the General
Assembly, the state Water Control Board held statewide public
hearings on its legislative proposals and fond public sentiment
strongly against implementation of a statewide water use permitting system. Legislative reception to the State Board's initiative has also been less than enthusiastic, only the previously
19 VA. CODE ANN. §62.l-44.87, (1986).
20 VA. CODE ANN. §32.l76.l, ~ ~, (1986).
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mentioned legislation, extremely limited in its scope, was
passed by the General Assembly in 1986. Thus the state water
Control Board will limit its legislative initiative in the
upcoming 1987 session of the General Assembly. The Board's only
anticipated introduction of legislation is a bill which would
modify the newly implemented agricultural water use reporting
system to make reporting mandatory. Although such a proposal, if
6ti is passed, may aid the state in monitoring one type of water
use in other than "groundwater management areas", it is a far cry
from needed use control reform.
Until a statewide permitting system or other use control
system is implemented, the state of Virginia will be forced to
deal with its seasonal water crises on an ad hoc basis. The
inefficiency of this type of response to resource management
calls for legislative reform of Virginia water rights law.
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Gregory Tolbert*
Legal scholars are proud to point to the fact that law evolves over time.
societal values change, the law usually has witnessed a carmensurate change.

As

Few

would deny that the law as we know it tcx1ay has changed a great deal from 1736.
However, the law has been very slow to depart from the marital rape exemption first
articulated by English Chief Justice Matthew Hale, who stated that nthe husband
cannot be guilty of a rape cOIllDitted by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract. nl
Although n Is] ociety recognizes rape as one of the most serious violent crimes,
one which scars its victims emotionally as well as physically, n2 few states are
willing to abandon the common law exemption.

As a result, the marital rape exemption

"denies a married woman the right, which a single woman has, to legal recourse against
her attacker."3
Today twenty-eight states continue to recognize the marital rape exemption and
prohibit the prosecution of a husband for the rape of his wife.
(Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska,

Only eight states

Jersey, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin)

New

have statutorily eliminated the marital rape exemption.
The law governing marital rape in Virginia recently has been changed. 4

While

Virginia has not abandoned the marital rape exemption completely, it indeed has taken
a step in that direction.
is still in question. 5

The Significance of the action by the virginia legislature
However, virginia has added itself to the list of jurisdic-

tions that question Chief Justice Hale's vision of the marriage contract.
This article explores the 1986 amendments6 to the Code of Virginia as they
*Gregory Tolbert is a 1st year law student at Marshall-wythe and as a menber of a
debate team at Lewis and Clark College debated marital rape laws.
1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 629 (1736).
2 CO!TIIlent, Marital Rape:

The Legislative Battle, 15 Colonial Law. 21 (1986).

3 Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of Privacy,
11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 717, 718 (1981).
4 Va. Code Ann.

§18.2-6l (1986).

5 CO!TIIlent, Sexism and the CO!!U1IOn Law:
U. L. Rev. 369, 385-387 (1986).
6 Va. Code Ann.

Spousal Rape in Virginia, 8 Geo. Mason

§18.2-6l,67.l,67.2,67.2:l (SUpp. 1986).
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relate to the issue of marital rape. Initially, this article will explain the
law governing marital rape in the C<JmroIl\olea1th of Virginia. It will examine the
language used in the statute to determine the limits of the law. Finally, this
article will analyze the barriers to complete statutory elimination of the cammon law
marital rape exemption.
I.

'l't!e

Law RegaIdim Marital

Rape in

Viwinia.

On January 20, 1986, House Bill 378 was introduced in the Virginia legislature.
The bill was passed by the Senate on March 4, 1986, and by the House of Delegates
on March 6, 1986. House Bill 378 is now codified as Section 18.2-61 of the Virginia
Code. This section reads as follows:
B. If any person has sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
and such act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the spouse or another, he or
she shall be guilty of rape.
However, no person shall be found guilty under this subsection unless, at the time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses
were living separate and apart, or (ii) the defendant caused
serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or
violence.
Additionally, there shall be no prosecution under this
subsection unless the spouse or saneone acting on the spouse's
behalf reports the violation to a law enforcement agency within
ten days of the ccmnission of the alleged offense. However, the
ten-day limitation shall not apply while the spouse is physically
unable to make such report or is restrained or otherwise prevented
from reporting the violation. 7
The enforcement section of the statute contains provisions for violators after
they are found guilty as well as proviSions for violators before a trial judgment is
entered. The enforcement sections reads as follows:
C. A violation of this section shall be punishable, in the
discretion of the court or jury, by confinement in the penitentiary for life or for any term not less than five years. In any
case deemed appropriate by the court, all or part of any sentence
imposed for a violation of subsection B may be suspended upon the
defendant's completion of counseling or therapy, if not already
provided, in the manner prescribed under Section 19.2-218.1 if,
after consideration of the views of the camp1aining witness and
such other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such
action will promote maintenance of the family unit and will be in
the best interest of the complaining witness.
Upon a finding of guilt under subsection B in any case tried
by the court without a jury, the court, without entering a
judgment of guilt, upon motion of the defendant and with the
consent of the complaining witness and the attorney for the
Commonwealth, may defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation pending completion of counseling or therapy, if
not already provided, in the manner prescribed under Section
19.2-218.1. If the defendant fails to so complete such counseling
or therapy, the court may make final disposition of the case and
proceed as otherwise provided. If such counseling is completed as
prescribed under Section 19.2-218.1, the court may discharge the
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against him if, after
consideration of the view of the camp1aining witness and such
other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such action
will pramote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best

D.

7 Va. Code Ann.

§18.2-61(B) (SUpp.1986).
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interest of the complaining witness. 8
The Virginia statute quite clearly rejects the cOlllllOn law marital rape exemption. In Virginia it is now possible to prosecute a husband for raping his wife or a
wife for raping her husband. However, the statute does not eliminate the marital rape
exemption completely. In fact, the Virginia statute only allows prosecution for
marital rape in two circumstances. The first situation in which it is possible to
prosecute for marital rape is where the spouses were living separate and apart at the
time of the violation. The second situation is where the defendant caused serious
physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence. In either situation,
the spouse or saneone acting on the spouse I s behalf must report the violation to a law
enforcement agency within ten days of the commission of the alleged offense, unless
the spouse is physically unable to make such a report or is restrained from reporting
the violation. Since victims of rape by saneone other than their spouse do not have
to comply with the ten-day limit, this reporting requirement may violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. 9 The statute itself seems clear at first
glance; however, interpretation of the statute may pose sane problems.
II.

Interpretation of the Virginia Marital Rape

statute

Since this statute should ultimately be judged by how effective it is at decreasing or eliminating the incidence of marital rape, it becomes inperative to examine
the language of the statute and the possible irrplications of interpretation of the
statute.

Reguir""'ffl't of Sep;lrate and wrt
Under the Virginia statute, absent a showing of serious physical injury, a
marital rape prosecution can occur only if _the spouses are living separate and
apart. This separate and apart requirement is problematic, and will no doubt be the
subject of much litigation.
Because the statute was enacted after the Weishaupt and Kizer decisions, there is
a presumption that the legislature was aware of those decisions. TWs, if the
legislature had wanted to overrule Weishaupt and Kizer it would have expressly done
so. As a result, the statute must be interpreted in light of the existing case law.
The first concern of the separate and apart requirement is what length of
time will suffice for the spouses properly being labeled as living separate and
apart. The statute is noticeably silent on this issue and as a result it will be left
to judicial interpretation. It is quite reasonable to suggest that courts will
probably not find that a mere day or week satisfies the living separate and apart
requirement. However, after that, it becomes harder to state what constitutes living
separate and apart.
The inclusion of the term "living" before the phrase "separate and apart"
8 Va. Code Ann.

S18 .2-61 (C) (D) (SUr:p. 1986).

9 Constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this article. ~, ~,24
(1985); Cormnent, supra note 5; T. Clancy, Equal Protection Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclusion, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1980).

J. FAM. L. 87

21

provides insight into the intent of this legislation.
"Living" inplies a certain
lO
continuousness of separation.
Thus, "living" clarifies the separate and apart
requirement, but it does not answer the question of how long the two spouses must
actually be living separate and apart to fulfill that requirement. Insight, may 'be
gained by examining what length of time has been deemed by the Virginia courts to
satisfy the requirement.
Although these cases were decided prior to the enactment of
the statute, they provide some guidance/precedent. In Weishauptll, the Virginia
SUpreme Court affirmed the conviction of Ronald Weishaupt who raped his wife after
living separate and apart for a little over eleven months. In ~12, the spouses
were separate and apart for three weeks prior to the alleged rape (although in Kizer,
the spouses had lived separate and apart previously), and the Virginia SUpreme Court
stated that "the evidence establishes that the parties lived separate and apart".13
One may conclude that the actual time limit for living separate and apart is relatively brief. This conclusion suggests there may be a related issue that is more important than the time limit of living separate and apart. That issue is consent.
The issue of consent is the foundation underlying the living separate and apart
requirement. If the spouses are living together the marital rape exenption still
applies (unless the defendant caused serious physical injury) based on the theory that
the spouses have consented to marital sex. By living separate ,and apart, the consent
to marital sex has been withdrawn. It is reasonable to equate the separate and
apart requirement with a lack of consent in that actually living separate and apart is
a nanifestation of the withdrawal of consent. There are potential problems with this
also, as the two previous court cases have used different standards to measure a
manifestation of living separate and apart. In Weishaupt, a unanimous Virginia
Supreme Court held:
A wife can unilaterally revoke her inTplied consent to marital
sex where, as here, she has made manifest her intent to terminate
the marital relationship by living separate and apart from her
husband, refraining from voluntary sexual intercourse with her
husband, and in light of all the circumstances, conducting hriself
in a manner that established a de facto end to the marriage.
Under this test, the length of time spouses are living separate and apart
is not of primary concern. The critical element is whether the spouse intends to end
the relationship. Judicial interpretation of the new statute may also require the
spouse manifest an intention to end the marriage to fulfill the separate and apart
requirement. Unfortunately, this test is conplicated, less than six months after
Weishaupt, the Virginia SUpreme Court modified the Weishaupt rule in Kizer. The Kizer
majority held:
[w]e think it is apparent that the wife subjectively considered
the marriage fractured beyond repair when the parties separated in
February. Nevertheless, we cannot say that this subjective
10 Black's Law Dictionary, 843 (5th ed. 1979), defines "living" as "[e]xisting,
surviving, or continuing in operation. Also means to abide, to dwell, to eside and
literally signifies the pecuniary resources by means of which one exists."
11 Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
12 Kizer v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
13 ~ at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
14 Weishaupt, 227 Va. 389, 405, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855.
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intent was manifested objectively to the husband, in view of the
wife's vacillating conduct, so that he perceived, or rea~gat>ly
should have perceived, that the marriage actually was ended.
The significance of this modification of Weishaupt is that the spouse Jmlst
manifest her intent to end the marriage to her spouse rather than to an objective
observer. Unfortunately, this "modification, for which the court offered no rationale, undeniably increases the wife's burden of proof in a spousal rape case."16 In
sum, it appears that the phrase nliving separate and apart n will be construed to mean
that the spouses are residing separate and apart and that a manifest intent to end the
marriage has been cOImlUnicated to the other spouse.
The spouses need not have cararenced divorce proceedings to fulfill the statutory
requirement of living separate and apart. Similarly, the statute does not speak to
what amount of contact between the spouses will preclude viewing them as living
separate and apart. Thus, the court will determine if the spouses were actually
living separate and apart at the time of the rape in order to prosecute the spouse
under the statute. If the Virginia SUpreme Court continues to follow~, it will
require that the spouses behavior be unequivocal, definite, and certain17 to demonstrate an end to the marriage by living separate and apart. At a minimum this would
require that the spouse refrain from voluntary sexual intercourse with the defendant 18
and exhibit conduct that establishes an actual end to the marriage. 19 This means that
contact between the two spouses is permissible but there can be no ambivalence or
uncertainty carmmicated between the spouses that would suggest that the marriage is
not over. COnsidering the facts of K1-~, the Virginia SUpreme COurt was very firm
regarding the requirement that the behavior be unequivocal, definite and certain. 20
As a result of these recent Virginia SUpreme Court decisions,2l the statutory language nliving separate and apart n should be construed to mean that the spouses
are residing separate and apart and that an unequivocal, definite and certain intent
to end the marriage has been manifested objectively to the defendant so that the
defendant perceived or reasonably should have perceived that the marriage was ended.
RlegUirf"'N't of serioos Physical InjUry

Under the Virginia statute, if the spouses are not living separate and apart at
15 Kizer, 228 Va. 256, 261, 321 S.E.2d 291, 294.
16 Comment, sUPra note 5, at 383.
17 Kizer, 228 Va. at 262, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
18 Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 855.
19 Kizer, 228 Va. at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
20 The majority in Kizer characterized the wife's conduct as vaCillating;
thus, the husband did not know that the marriage was over. However, the husband and
wife were on their way to consult a lawyer about obtaining legal separation. They did
not see the lawyer because she did not want to put another emotional burden on her
husband who was worried about his seriously ill father. Additionally, the husband
already had initiated court action to obtain custody of their child, which seems to
indicate that in fact he did perceive the marriage to be over. 228 Va. 256, 262, 321
S.E.2d 291,294 (Thomas, J. and carrico, C.J., dissenting).
21 ~ Weishaupt, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 and Kizer, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d
291.
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the time of the rape, the spouse may not be prosecuted unless the defendant caused
serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence. Because a
significant number of the marital rape prosecutions will arise under this section, it
is necessary to explore its meaning in some detail. The issues of consent and serious
physical injury must be examined.
Because the spouses may still be living together and presumably no intent to end
the marriage has been camrunicated, the issue of whether the spouse consented to
marital sex with the defendant becomes a major concern. If the spouse freely consented to marital sex it would not be characterized as rape; thus, statute applies only in
those cases where the wife does not consent to sexual intercourse. Most likely,
courts will hold that as long as two spouses are living together; there will be
consent to sexual intercourse. Therefore most prosecutions will result in cases
involving serious physical injury.
The serious physical injury requirement establishes a formidable hurdle to
prosecuting a spouse for marital rape. The language of the statute implies that any
harm that occurs to the spouse during marital sex, short of serious physical injury,
is not within the scope of this requirement. The statute does not allow marital rape
prosecution for minor physical injury.
The use of the phrase "by the use of force or violence" only increases that
hurdle. The Virginia legislature clearly wrote a statute that would limit the nl.lIl'ber
of marital rape cases. The use of the word violence22 signifies a legislative
concern that only extreme cases be prosecuted under this statute. 23
This statute will not allow prosecution of a defendant who rapes his spouse under
the threat of serious physical injury. serious physical injury must in fact occur.
This requirement causes obvious problems. SuR?Qse that a defendant rapes his spouse,
threatening to harm a child if the spouse does not engage in sexual intercourse.
Under the statute, this would not constitute marital rape, because the defendant did
not cause serious physical injury. Consider the case where a defendant rapes his
spouse at gun point. No one would deny that the spouse was raped, yet the defendant
did not cause serious physical injury to the spouse. The language of the statute
would indicate that while this behavior is certainly reprehensible, it is also beyond
the scope of the statute. These exanples clearly establish the inadequacy of the
statute. Although there may be reasons for not enacting a more expansive statute, no
one can deny that the scope of this statute is clearly limited.
The virginia statute is silent as to psychological injury caused by the spouSe.
Because recent stUdies have indicated that the psychological harm suffered by the
victim in a marital rape is significant,24 this should warrant prosecution.
In sumnary, the serious physical injury requirement inq;x>ses a heavy statutory
22 Black's Law Dictionary, 1408 (5th ed. 1979), defines "violence" as an "[u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accomplishment of vehemence,
outrage or fury."
23 The Virginia legislature could have enacted a statute requiring that the
defendant cause physical injury to the spouse by the use of force. This wording
would have expanded the scope of protection afforded by the statute.
24 Marital rape victims, like their nonspousal rape counterparts, must live with
the effects of being raped and the psychological torture that follows. Additionally,
marital rape victims usually are faced with the devastating circumstances of living
with their rapist and their betrayal. ~ D. p'§ffll, RaPe In Marriage (1982) •
24

burden on a prosecutor seeking conviction under the Virginia marital rape statute.
It is likely that only a limited mmtler of cases will surmount that hurdle.
Penalties of the Virginia statute
Under the enforcement section of the statute, a court may sentence a violator to
five years to life in the state penitentiary. In cases where the court deems it
appropriate, all or part of the sentence can be suspended and the defendant may be
recommended for counseling or psychological therapy instead. This alternative
punishment is inappropriate in a rape statute.
The substitution of counseling or therapy for violation of the statute conveys
the attitude that the offense is not serious. Nonspousal rape defendants are not
afforded the lUXUry of having a court decide to let them forego a prison term and
instead be placed in counseling. 25 In addition, the counseling statute26 does not
contain any durational requirements, though presumably the court would impose a
specified period of treatment.
A second concern with the enforcement section of the statute is the emphasis it
attaches to the prOiOOtion and maintenance of the family unit. It would be difficult
to imagine a statute allowing a convicted murderer or one convicted of fraud to forego
prison simply to preserve the family unit. Yet in a case where the defendant engages
in an activity that is itself destructive of the family unit, the court is given the
option of placing the defendant in counseling or therapy in order to prarote or
maintain the family unit. The statute treats marital rape as a social problem rather
than a crime. The counseling or therapy option is a remnant of the camon law
attitude towards marital rape.
It is obvious that the option of counseling or therapy should not be available
where the spouses are in the process of divorce, as there is no family unit to
preserve.
Similarly, the option of counseling or therapy should be unavailable in
cases where the rape occurred while the spouses were living separate and apart.
The psychological counseling statutorily available to the court is an obvious
escape clause in the enforcement of the marital rape statute. Given the destructive
nature of the crime, n [j]udges should construe the counseling and therapy proviSiOns
narrowly and recognize that only the strongest of mitigating factors could justify the
substitution of treatment for criminal penalties in this area of the law. n27
The extent of the Virginia marital rape statute is limited, due in part to
continuing allegiance to outdated COJmOOn law ideas. While the statute is a step
toward reform, it is not the giant step which is necessary.
Even after the passage of the Virginia statute, many spouses are not protected
from the horrors of marital rape. The statute defines marital rape too narrowly.
The statute must be amended to completely eliminate the marital rape exenpt:ion.
25 section l8.2-6l(c) (6) of the Virginia Code only allows counseling if the
defendant is prosecuted under section B of the statute, which deals with marital rape;
thus nonspousal rape defendants are not permitted to go through counseling under
l8.2-{j1. VA. CODE ANN. S18.2-{jl (SUpp. 1986).
26 VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-2l8.l.
27 Comnent, supra note 5, at 386.
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Several states have already adopted statutes which prohibit all marital rape. 28
Although these states have experienced considerable success, it is inportant to
discuss the possible reasons for rejecting a similar marital rape statute in Virginia.
In. Barriers to Reform

Opposition to the complete elimination of the marital rape exemption generally
revolves around three arguments. First is the inherent evidentiary problems presented
by a marital rape prosecution. Second, legislators fear vindictive spouses who might
use a claim of marital rape as a tool for coercion. Finally, sane carrnentators argue
that prosecution hinders marital reconciliation.
Because the major difference between marital sex and marital rape is the lack of
spousal consent, many opposed to elimination of the exemption suggest it is difficult
to determine consent when dealing with marital rape. This argument is illogical and
hypocritical. If it were followed to its logical conclusion, this argument would not
permit prosecution for crimes that are difficult to prove. Many crimes are difficult
to prove [however] and no one has suggested reroving them for that reason. 29 In
addition, II [d) ifficulties with evidence and proof in rape cases are not unique in the
marital setting, but are characteristics of several crimes ,in general".30
Nevertheless, every state allows prosecutions for nonspousal rape. Although it is true that
in a marital rape prosecution it is one spouse's word against the other's, the same is
true outside of the marital context. 31 Generally, the courts are not forced to rely
merely on the spouse's testimony, "[t]he presence of bruises and contusions on the
victim militates against the conclusion that the intercourse was consensual. .. 32
The marital rape exemption should not be retained sinply because of evidentiary
difficulties.
The second argument against eliminating the marital rape exemption is 'the
"vindictive spouse" theory. This argument suggests that a spouse would use the
charge of marital rape to harm the other spouse. Those opposed to statutory reform
suggest that the marital rape charge would becane a tool of coercion to be used in
bargaining for alimony, child custody and property settlements. The fear of fabricated charges from vindictive spouses contradicts the argument concerning a lack of
evidence. Certainly a spouse would be in a better bargaining position if she fabricated a charge that would be more readily accepted by our courts. If lack of evidence
for a marital rape charge renders a conviction difficult, then a vindictive spouse
28 See Fla. stat. Ann. §794.011 (West Supp. 1985) 1 Ran. stat. Ann. §21-3502
(Supp. 1984h Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 265, §22 (West SUpp. 1985h Reb. Rev. stat.
§§163.355-.375 (1985b vt. stat. Ann. tit. 13 §3252 (Supp. 1985b Wisc:. stat. Arm.
§940.255(6) (West SuPP. 1985). In People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567,
485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), New York reroved its marital rape exemption. In Warren
v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221, Georgia did not allow the marital rape exemption.
29 M. Freeman, But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Whom Can You Rape?
Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 Fall. L. Q. 1, 18 (1981).
30 Comment, Rape in Marriage:
L. Rev. 109, 114 (1980).
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"With This Ring ••• n, 86

could be expected to use other more effective false charges for coercion. Additionally, if the vindictive spouse argtUOeIlt is true, excluding marital rape charges would do
little to stop a spouse who could claim charges of assault,33 false imprisonment,
child abuse, severe emotional distress, fraud, or other charges. If this argmnent
were true, court should be inundated with claims by vindictive spouses and their
fabricated charges. Quite the contrary occurred in Oregon where the marital rape
exenption was eliminated. Peter Sandrock, an Oregon district attorney, testifying
before the Senate JUdiciary carmi.ttee in the California legislature, said that Oregon
had no problems after passage of a bill allowing wives to press charges against
their husbands. 34 The Georgia Supreme Court was adamant in its skepticism of this
argtUOeIlt when it stated: "[t]here is no other crime we can think of in which all of
the victims are denied protection simply because someone might fabricate a charge;
there is no evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys with revenge
filled tnmp!d-up charges ... 35 This may be due to the fact that a marital rape charge
is very embarrassing for the victim,36 and most victims elect to privatize the
experience. 37 The misplaced fear of vindictive spouses should not stand in the way of
legislative reform to afford married persons the same protection offered their
unmarried counterparts.
The third argument advanced against elimination of the marital rape exenption is
that allowing prosecutions for marital rape would undermine or prevent marital
reconciliation. This argument neglects the fact that when rape occurs in a marriage
the spouses very well may be better off apart. 38 This argument does not justify
denying a spouse a remedy when a rape has occurred. If the legislature truly believes
that marital reconciliation is more important than prosecuting a spouse for rape,
they should deny other causes of action that might be disruptive to marital reconciliation. Yet, spouses may still bring actions against each other on a variety of
charges. There must be a weighing of concerns and statutory protection from the
abuse of marital rape should outweigh the unlikely chance of marital reconciliation.

Conclusion
Virginia's new statute allowing prosecution for marital rape in a limited number
of circumstances is a step in the right direction. One JIllst realize however,
that the scope of the Virginia statute is narrow, and it is only the first step on
the road to reform. Virginia has cast aside the outdated C<IIIIlPn law view of Chief
Justice Hale. Now is the time to statutorily eliminate the marital rape exenption,
and afford everyone the same protection from rape. It should make no difference in
33 Comnent, Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 Marg. L. Rev. 120, 126 (1981).
34 S. Barry, Spousal Rape:

The UnCO!!lllOn Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 1088, 1091 (1980).

35 Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985).
36 Comnent, supra note 31, at 107.
37 Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 Harv. ~ Rev. 1255, 1269 (1986).
38 weishaupt v. Conmonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 405, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (1984).
"[I]f the marriage has already deteriorated to the point where intercourse IIlIst be
comranded at the price of violence we doubt that there is anything left to reconcile." IQ. ~ also, Corment, supra note 30, at 115.
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the eyes of the law whether the victim of rape is a stranger or a spouse.
violent crime that should be prosecuted.
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Rape is a

RELIGIOUS USES

OF LARD AND ZORIIG:

fiE REED FOR A

HEW FRAIIBWOU

Gary C10se*
In seventeen words the First Amendment prohibits Congress,
and by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
states,l from creating legislation which would prohibit the free
exercise of religion. aCongress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ••• • 2 Any government action which touches on religious
activity then is potentially an impermissible infringement on
free exercise rights.
However, the Supreme Court has not
interpreted the First Amendment to give blanket immunity from
governmental regulation to religious activity. The freedom to
believe is absolute, but the right to act on those beliefs is
sometimes subject to governmental regulation. 3 Some level of
regulatory interaction between church and state is inevitable.
Churches do not exist in a vacuum.
The problem which zoning poses is at what level of governmental zoning .regulation are free exercise issues brought to
play?
That is, when is a church's right to be left alone
violated by a zoning ordinance?
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 the
Supreme Court expressly cited zoning regulations as a permissible
governmental "contact" with religious conduct. The Court did not
say when the permissible governmental contact becomes impermissible.
State and lower federal courts have had to make this
decision.
These decisions have been inconsistent in large
measure because the Supreme Court has yet to develop a clear test
to determine when an infringement on free exercise rights has
occurred. While Sherbert v. Verner 5 is the accepted standard by
which to judge free exercise issues, it is by no means clear. 6
Sherbert balances the governmental interest against the church's
First Amendment interest. But before it does so, the analysis
asks whether the ordinance impacts on a central religious
belief.
Sherbert may make use of "religious belief" as part of
*Gary Close is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe, a member
of the state board of directors for the Virginia Society for
Human Life, Co-Chairman of the Marshall-Wythe Federalist Society
and former newseditor for the STAR-EXPONENT in Culpeper, Virginia.
1 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
2 U.S. Const. Amend. I.
3 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
4 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
5 376 U.S. 403 (1963).

6 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 813-835 (1978).
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its test, but the Supreme Court has constantly refused to define
what constitutes a valid religious belief. 7 Without knowing what
constitutes a valid religious belief, protected by First Amendment heightened scrutiny standards, it is hard to know what uses
of land are more central to religious belief and, therefore, are
more likely to qualify for First Amendment protection.
This lack of a clear standard leaves lower courts with no
guidance when faced with the competing interest of the state to
control land use and the church's desire to operate free from
governmental interference.
Often municipalities argue, and
courts accept, narrow definitions of religious activity. This
places most church action in the secular field, such as building
construction, and beyond the sticky standards of review required
by Sherbert. Other courts rule that almost any activity undertaken by churches is protected by the First Amendment and,
therefore, immune from zoning regulations.
Throughout the country churches and municipalities are
clashing over zoning regulations.
In Fairhaven, Massachusetts,
local zoning administrators ruled that Bible studies were home
occupations and, therefore, prohibited under the city's zoning
ordinances. 8 In Fairfax County, Virginia, a zoning administrator's attempt to define permissible religious activity, in the
context of the county's zoning plan, raised a public furor among
county congregations. 9 He ruled that activity not within the
county's definition was prohibited without a special permit.
Presently, the City of Colorado Springs is seeking an injunction
to halt worship services in a private home. The city argues the
worship services are in violation of its zoning regulations. lO
The general consensus among many religious leaders is that
churches more often than not are losing zoning cases once the
issue gets to court. ll "The courts have been extremely skeptical
of religious organizations claiming special dispensation," said
Geoffrey Stone, a professor at the University of Chicago Law
School, in a recent Washington Post article on the issue. 12
As one commentator has already noted. there is no guarantee
7 Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953).
8 Swallow, "Church-State Dispute Finds A New Arena:
Boards," Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1985, at A-I.

Zoning

9 Id.~ Zoning Intepretation Number 52, Fairfax County Zoning
Department, Fairfax, VA, June 14, 1984.
10 City of Colorado springs v. Richard Blanche, Civ. Action
No. 85 CU 3241, Division No.5 (1986).
11 Washington Post at A-8.
12 Id.
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that the application of zoning laws, a twentieth century invention, will not over time undermine the protections granted
churches in the constit:ution. 13 What is needed, before the issue
becomes more politicized, is an analysis of the competing
interests and a clear test designed to fairly address those
interests.
Part I. Roots of the Conflict: The State's Interest in Zoning.
That there is a conflict between the land control interests
of the state and the church's desire for unhindered activity
seems to come as no surprise to anyone.
Indeed, most commentators on the general subject foind conflict between the two
inevitable. 14 One commentator found the conflict due to new
roles taken on by churches, such as church schools and day care
centers, and a concurrent furor on the part of zoning officials
to regulate anything that moved. 15
Zoning is an outgrowth of the state's expanded role in
society.
It is a vehicle for public control and direction over
private land use. 16
In 1916, New York City passed the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Others followed New York's
lead.
They did not go unchallenged, and in 1926, the Supreme
Court ruled on the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning
ordinances.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,17 the Court
came down solidly on the side of zoning ordinances. They are a
valid exercise of the state's broad police powers, and as such
are valid unless they are clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, and
have no substantial relation to the public's health, safety,
morals or general welfare. 18
The zoning power of municipalities was reaffirmed and more
strongly entrenched after the Supreme Court's Belle Terre 19
decision.
In that decision, Justice Douglas outlined the proper
goals of zoning and the power from which the state may enforce
ordinances to achieve those goals.
13 Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct,
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 NW. U.L. Rev. 786, 790
(1981) •
14 Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the
First Amendment, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 767 (1985) 1 Note, Land Use
Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1562
(1984)1 Walker, What Constitutes a Religious Use For Zoning
Purposes, 27 Cath. Law. 129 (1982).
15 64 B.U.L. Rev. at 768, fn. 14.
16 76 NW. U. L. Rev., supra note at 795.
17 272 U.S. 365 (1926) •
18 Id. at 391.
19 416 U.S. 1 (1974) •
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A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in
a land-use project addressed to family needs.
The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places.
It is ample to layout
zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclus~~n and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people.
Creation of quiet neighborhoods is a valid governmental
objective according to Belle Terre.
Exclusion of churches from
neighborhoods is often based on that very objective.
The
reasoning used is that churches create noise and traffic problems. Belle Terre encourages localities to exclude those activities that create noise and traffic, including churches, to
preserve peace in residential neighborhoods.
However, where fundamental freedoms are involved, the
Supreme Court has, since Belle Terre, placed some limits on a
municipality's zoning powers. Two cases, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland 2l and Schad v. Mount Ephraim,22 have carved out niches
in the state's overall zoning power. In Moore, just three years
after the Belle Terre decision, the Court held that where
fundamental freedoms are infringed upon, zoning ordinances must
come under a heightened standard of review -- the "rational
relation" test outlined in Belle Terre does not apply.23
In ~, the contested ordinance excluded all live entertainment, including nude dancing, from the municipality.
The
Court found this restricted expression protected by the First
Amendment. The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional. The
Court's rationale is especially relevant to the problem of this
article. Although Justice White acknowledged the broad power of
local governments to zone land, he also stressed that, "The
zoning power must be exercised within constitutional limits.n24
Where constitutional protections are threatened, White set out a
two-tiered standard of review. First, White said the standard of
review for a zoning ordinance is "determined by the right
assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being
exercised. n25 Since the right being threatened in ~ was
protected by the First Amendment, the Court used a strict
20 Id. at 9.
21 431 u.S. 494 (1977) •
22 452 u.S. 61 (1981).
23
24

12·

at 499.

~,

452 u.S. at 60.

25 Id.
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scrutiny standard of review. 26 Secondly, White said a reviewing
court must decide whether the proponent of the ordinance used the
least restrictive means to further the legitimate state interest. If not, the ordinance fails. 27
The Supreme Court applied these two principles to the Schad
case and found the city ordinance lacking.
As if to underscore in red ink Justice White's opinion,
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurrence which reiterates much of
what White wrote. He made unequivocably sure that the presumption of validity, usually given zoning ordinances, is destroyed
when First Amendment questions are involved:
I would emphasize that the presumption of validity that
traditionally attends a local government's exercise of
its zoning power carries little, if any, weight where
the zoning regulation trenches on the ri~~ts of
expression protected under the First Amendment.
While municipal ordinances clearly enjoy a strong presumption of
validity because of the state's broad police powers, the ~
opinion makes it equally clear that where protected rights are
affected, the presumption is sometimes lost.
Euclid and Belle Terre stand for the proposition that zoning
regulations are a proper expression of the state's police power
and enjoy a presumption of validity. The Euclid court said a
rational relation between the ordinance and the power upon which
the ordinance was based is all that is required to remain valid
upon judicial review.
Moore and Schad chilled this presumption of validity.
Where fundamental freedoms, including freedom of worship, is
restricted by a zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance loses its
presumption of validity. ~ specifically stands for the
principle that when a zoning ordinance restricts a protected
First Amendment activity, the ordinance must pass constitutional
muster under a strict scrutiny standard. And that higher
standard is triggered by the mere assertion that First Amendment
activity is threatened.
Courts have not applied these principles to zoning disputes
where churches are involved. The reason is simple. Churches
claim the zoning ordinance restricts their free exercise rights.
Courts react by applying the Sherbert free exercise analysis.
Often, the analysis ignores Schad and Moore while emphasizing the
presumption of validity zoning ordinances enjoy under Euclid and
Belle Terre.

26 Id. at 71.
27 Id. at 70.
28 Schad, 452 u.S. at 77.
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Part II.

~be ~raditional

Analysis Applied by Courts:
Sherbert v. Verner.
Once a religious group claims a zoning ordinance infringes
on their free exercise rights, the courts turn to Braunfeld
v. Brown 29 and Sherbert v. Verner 30 for guidance. These two
cases set the standards by which courts determine whether a
governmental regulation impermissibly restricts religious
activity.
The problem they present is two-fold. Firstly, the
two cases create different standards of review. Sherbert does
not overrule Braunfeld, but Sherbert gives a higher level of
protection to First Amendment free exercise claims than does
Braunfeld.
Secondly, the Sherbert analysis, when applied by
courts, is used in a way inconsistent with the Moore and Schad
decisions.
In Braunfeld, the Supreme Court upheld a Sunday closing law
against a free exercise challenge by an Orthodox Jew. He claimed
the mandated Sunday closing prevented him from compensating for
business he lost by closing on Saturday: the Sabbath according
to his faith. The loss in business, he claimed, made it impossible for him to continue in his livelihood and remain true to
his faith.
The Court held that the statute was enacted to
achieve a legitimate, secular state objective. 3l It did not
compel a choice between religious practice and criminal penalty;
-the Sunday law simply regulated a secular activity and, as
applied to appellants, operated so as to make the practice of
their religious belief more expensive. n32 Therefore, it passed
constitutional muster.
Braunfeld, then stands for the proposition that where the purpose of the law is secular, where it
incidentally burdens religious activity and does not make a
religious belief criminal --the statute has a presumption of
validity.
While not overturning Braunfeld, Sherbert v. Verner greatly
expanded the extent to which religious interests could be
protected from state infringement.
In Sherbert, the appellant
was a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired by her employer for
refusing to work on Saturday--her faith's Sabbath. She could not
find work and applied for unemployment benefits. The state
denied her the benefits because she would not accept work when
offered.
Apparently, the work offered to the Seventh-Day
Adventist required Saturday hours. The law required applicants
for unemployment to look for work.
If work was offered, the
29 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
30 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31
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applicant had to accept the job.
Failure to do so triggered
cessation of the unemployment benefits.
The Court struck down the state law upon which unemployment
benefits had been denied. To force her to accept work contrary
to her religious beliefs in order to receive unemployment
benefits was an impermissible infringement the Court said.
Braunfeld and Sherbert are inconsistent.
The Braunfeld
Court held that where a law with a secular purpose incidentally
burdens religious practice, the law has a presumption of validity. The Sherbert Court held that a law with a secular purpose
may be invalid when it has an incidental effect on religious
practice. The conflict is obvious and noted by Justices Stewart,
Harlan, and White in their concurring opinions to Sherbert.
Despite this inconsistency, the majority opinion refused to
overrule Braunfeld. The result is two separate tests for free
exercise analysis.
Inconsistency is one legacy of Sherbert. Another legacy is
the tripartite test outlined in the opinion.
To determine
whether or not legislation impermissibly infringes on free
exercise rights, the Court will ask:
(a) does the government
action burden the practice of a particular religious belief,33
(b) if yes, is there a compelling state interest for doing so,34
and (c) if so, did the government use the means for accomplishing
this interest which are least restrictive on the religious
practice?35
If the public interest is compelling and no less
restrictive means are available, then the regulation passes
constitutional muster.
How have lower courts applied the Sherbert test? City of
Chula Vista v. pagard 36 and Grosz v. City of Miami Beach 37 both
offer an example of the test's application. A close reading of
the two cases shows that the courts, in effect do not apply the
Sherbert test. Either court's ignore the religious nature of the
activity regulated as in Chula Vista or they ignore the Sherbert
analysis as in Grosz.
Part III. Problems in the Current Analysis
The problems in current free exercise analysis, when applied
33
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374 u.S. at 403.

34 Id. at 406.
35 Id. at 407.
36 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1981) •
37 721 F.2d 729 (1983) •
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to zoning disputes, has not gone unnoticed. 38

Two of the more

recent comments on the issue have summarized together the major
flaws in the analysis touched upon by other commentators. 39
1. The Note Analysis. 40
A note in the 1984 Columbia Law Review specifically identifies three major problems in the court's free exercise test. the
first, and perhaps most damaging problem from the perspective of
churches, is the evaluation of the religious practice.
In the
Sherbert analysis, this is the first step courts should take.
Whether they follow Sherbert or not, all courts evaluate the
religious nature of the burdened activity if for no other reason
than that churches claim a religious activity i2 burdened by the
zoning regulations. "This is an important threshold inquiry, for
if a burdened practice is not deemed to be religious, it merits
no free exercise protection--regardless of whether the public
interest is compelling and the regulation narrowly drawn."4l
There are two approaches to deciding whether a practice is
of religious significance:
(1) the sinceritv of the group's
42
claim
or, (2) the centrality of that practice to the group's
religion.
The note correctly points out that evaluation by
sincerity, the court's assessment of the religious group's good
faith, is more in keeping with Thomas v. Review board and its
injunction against a court using secular standards by which to
judge the validity of religious beliefs. In Thomas, a Jehovah's
Witness quit his job at a steel plant because it produced steel
for weapons.
He felt working at the plant conflicted with his
religious beliefs. The state refused to give him unemployment
benefits. The state argued that Thomas resigned not because of
religious reasons, but more because of personal philosophical
preferences. Therefore, the state argued, it was not obligated
to give Thomas unemployment benefits.
The trial court agreed with the state, but the Supreme Court
did not. Wrote Chief Justice Burger:
Relgious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
38 ~, Reynolds, Zoning the Church:
The Police Power
Versus the First Amendment. 64 B.U.L. Rev. 767 (1984); Preysner,
Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasonableness. 12
Conn. L. Rev. (1980).
39 Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause.
84 Colum. L. Rev. 1562 (1984); Walker, What Constitutes a
Religious Use for Zoning Purposes, 27 Cath. Law. 129 (1982).
40 Note, ~ note 64.
41 Id. at 1573.
42 See, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise
Clause:
A Model of Competing Authorities.
90 Yale L. J. 350,
371 (1980) (the note suggests religious sincerity may be measured
by the lack of profit or accumulation of material gains associated with the religious belief).
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consistent or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection ••• c~urts are not
arbiters of scriptural "interpretation.·
The Court accepted Thomas' good faith claim that he quit his job
because of his religious beliefs.
The second approach to deciding whether a practice is of
re1gious significance is the centrality approach. According to
the note, the determination of what is "central"; to a re1gious
faith and, therefore, worthy of First Amendment protection
invites arbitrary judicial evaluation of what constitutes a
re1gious belief or practice. In effect, a court uses its values
in determining whether or not a religion's practices are worthy
of protection.
The Chula Vista analysis is a good example of
In Chula Vista, a religious group's
this kind of process.
communal living arrangements was deemed in violation of zoning
ordinances. The courts ruled against the religious group. The
religious group's communal living was, according to the court's
standards, a secular expression of be1iefi despite the fact that
the defendants ·sincere1y believed" communal living to be
"affected with religious character."44 The court decided
communal living was not central to the sect's religion despite
the fact that the sect defined communal living as central to its
faith.
Once the re1gious practice is deemed secular, the
analysis stops. The state is not required to demonstrate a less
restrictive means of regulation was unavailable. According to
the note, the centrality analysis should not be a threshold
test.
Judging the centrality of a religious belief is at best
slippery.
It ought to be left to the end of the analysis, or a
last resort, after sure and concrete First Amendment safeguards
have been examined and found lacking.
The second problem the note identifies in the present free
exercise analysis is the nature of the permitted burden.
The
language of Sherbert allows for manipulation by courts to find
only a very narrow range of burdens on re1gious practices.
sherbert invites courts to find at the outset that a practice is
not re1gious. Chula Vista is an example of this. Because the
re1gious burdens in zoning cases are not "severe, life-threatening economic sanctions,·45 but rather burdens of ·convenience,
dollars or aesthetics,a46 they are dismissed as unimportant. But
the note correctly points out that nothing in the Sherbert
decision indicates that the free exercise protections should be
drawn so narrowly. Because they are drawn narrowly, most courts
43 Thomas, 450 u.S. at 714, 715, 716.
44 Chula Vista, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
45 Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 306.
46 Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739.
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find the asserted practice outside the protections of the First
Amendment.
The third identified problem is the overwhelming strength of
the asserted governmental interest in zoning matters. When the
analysis reaches the balancing stage, it almost invariably tips
in the government's favor.
Zoning regulations are tied to the
state's strongest interest--the health, safety, and welfare of
society as a whole. The church's interest pales in comparison.
2. The Walker Test. 47
Drawing on Sherbert, Moore, Thomas v. Review Board and a
number of New York state cases, Walker argues that free exercise
issues should be decided with sensitivity to
First Amendment
protections. He argues that presently in zoning cases courts try
to ignore free exercise issues rather than grapple with their
complexities. The most common approaches are to find the alleged
relgious use secular or to find it outside the "corea of relgious
belief.
Once a use is found secular, courts apply a rational
basis standard of review.
Walker argues this unnecessarily
restricts protected relgious activity and opens up much religious
activity to state regulation.
The problem in present free
exercise analysis in zoning cases according to Walker, stated
simply, is that lower courts are not following the heightened
standards of review required when relgious activity is infringed
upon.
Part of the reason for this lapse is the narrow definitions of religious activity used.

3.

Proposed Solutions.
The Walker article calls for use of the Sherbert analysis 48
but within a more rigidly defined framework. First, he advocates
an expanded conception of relgious activity. This brings many
more zoning cases under the Sherbert analysis. Secondly, he says
to be consistent with Moore and Thomas v. Review Board, courts
should address only the sincerity of the belief--not its centrality to the relgious faith as a whole.
The note advocates a more radical change in the court's free
exercise analysis.
It lowers the threshold for free exercise
issues to come into play, expands the concept of impermissible
burdens on religion, restructures how we should evaluate the
government's interest, and then balances the two interests. The
new test will, according to the note, lessen the number of
rejected religious claims based upon a threshold analysis.
First, the note calls for postponement of judicial inquiry
into the centrality of the relgious use until the end of the
47 Walker, ~ note 64.

48 Id. at 182, 183.
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analysis.

It adopts a ·sincerity" standard, just as Walker does,

in order for a free exercise analysis to be triggered. If a good
faith claim is made by a religious group that its land use is
protected from zoning ordinances because of religious be1ief--the court will accept the claim. This is in keeping with ~,
which held that judicial review should be based on the right
nasserted1y threatened" rather than the power being exercised. 49
Postponing the centrality issue also forces the state to first
make a case for the importance of its interest rather than
dismissing the church's interest before a balancing analysis is
started. 50
Secondly, the note would expand the concept of impermissible
re1gious burdens.
The note points to Wisconsin v. Yoder 51 as
support for this proposition.
In Wisconsin, a neutral state
education law affected a relgious practice. The Supreme Court
found it to impermissibly infringe on the free exercise rights of
Amish parents to control the education of their children. Under
Braunfeld, it would stand. But Yoder held even indirect effects
of religious-neutral laws can create impermissible burdens.
Again, this acts to expand the area in which free exercise
analysis is applicable. Thus, the effect of this stage of the
note analysis would be to bring any law that impacted on relgious
practice under a free exercise analysis.
Thirdly, the note shifts the emphasis on the government's
interest.
Rather than focus on whether the interest is "compelling," the note requires judicial inquiry into the possibilities
for compromise.
The burden falls upon the state to prove why
compromise is not acceptable. Whether or not the state can show
that compromise is impossible is a factual finding for courts to
make.
Lastly, the note analysis requires balancing the burden on
the relgious practice against the governmental interest. The
note suggests that severity of burden to the religious interest
should be measured by the degree to which the regulation actually
inhibits religious observances.
As a guidepost in determining the relgious burden, the note
suggests a "centrality" analysis. The Sherbert analysis, as is,
tempts courts to make the determinations at the beginning of the
inquiry.
Here, it is near the end. The court initially determines if the regulation touches upon something that is "central"
to the sect's belief and practice. The more central the regulated belief or practice, the greater the burden on the religion.
49

~,

452 U.S. at 71.

50 Note, ~ note 64 at 1578.
51 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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The flaw with the "centralityn test as pointed out earlier is the
sUbstitution of judicial values and conceptions as to what is
central to a sect's belief for the sect's own interpretation of
its belief system.
Part V. Conclusion
What the note and Walker analysis does is give a presumption
of validity to free exercise claims. It is up to the government
to prove why a relgious exemption should not be granted. There
is nothing wrong with this shift.
It flows logically from the
Schad and ~ decisions.
They indicated First Amendment
freedoms, those fundamental to individual liberty, should be
given a high degree of protection. Presently, in zoning cases,
First Amendment freedoms are not being protected. Religious uses
are found secular by courts and, therefore, outside free exercise
analysis.
The note analysis brings these uses into the free
exercise realm as they should be. According to ~, the right
assertedly threatened should trigger the standard of review.
Does the note analysis mean life will be easier for zoning
officials or for neighborhoods where yards are wide and blue-eyed
children run free? The answer is no. Municipalities and home
owners will have to accommodate religious uses of property.
Increased traffic, loud hymn singing, church bells, and unruly
church crowds will all have to be endured by neighborhoods where
churches locate. First Amendment freedoms, in order to flourish,
often require accommodation from other segments of society:
The courts have repeatedly held that citizens must
endure a certain amount of inconvenience in order to
protect First Amendment rights ••• There are numerous
instances in which a citizen's lesser protected rights
are forced to yield ~f the higher protection for a
First Amendment right.
The note analysis merely brings church use of land into the realm
of First Amendment protection where it belongs.

52 Comments, 76 NW. U. L. Rev. at 808.
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THE TIME IS RIPE FOR A SMALL CLAIMS COURT IN VIRGINIA
D.E. Barney*
A woman vacated her Northern Virginia apartment this Fall, and a
common scenario ensued.
Her landlord notified her that her $183
security deposit would not be returned due to damage the landlord
claimed the

tenant had done to the

residence.

Unlike many

vacating tenants who acquiesce in this type of landlord embezzlement to avoid haggling,
posit.

Upon

inquiry,

this woman sought to recover her de-

she found that her only recourse was

through the Virginia General District Court, where small claims
can be pursued

~

see

Unfortunately, the woman is not well

versed in the intricacies of Virginia's landlord-tenant law;
proceeding RLQ §g was not a realistic option.
She retained an
attorney who recovered her $183 and then billed her $500, the
fair value of his services. While the verdict vindicated the
tenant's rights as a matter of principle, the final accounting
failed to corroborate this result.
Virginia's

lack

of a

special small claims court places

claimants of small amounts in a quandary:

either proceed pro

§g

and hope that the District Court judge will help the litigants
with points of law and that the other party will not have an
attorney, hire and pay a lawyer of one's own, or forego a claim
entirely.

The first alternative is risky at best, the second is

often prohibitive, and the third is patently unacceptable.

A

statutory small claims court is necessary so that such claimants
have a forum where facts can be pled to a judge charged with
aiding the parties, hearing the facts, and researching and
applying the law.
The problem with Virginia's system of handling small claims
is

that

the system often does not work

in the

interest of

justice.
Although the judges are competent and fair, and the
litigants have an opportunity to be heard, this system does not
serve the ideals of a small claims forum.
Such a forum relaxes
strict procedural and evidentiary rules to facilitate efficient
resolution of disputes.
footing

Litigants face each other on equal

without attorney manipulation,

allowing

judges to

question witnesses in an informal proceeding.
This type of
proceeding can resolve a dispute over a small amount of money
quickly,

simply and

inexpensively.

In other words,

such a

forum makes the litigation of small claims feasible.
Virginia's present system of handling small claims through
the General District Court appears workable on its face and in
*Dale Barney is a graduate of the University of Virginia, and a
third year law student at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William & Mary. He is a member of the Editorial Staff and the
school's Jessup Moot Court team.
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theory.

The lack of standard small claims ground rules however,

injects an element of uncertainty into these proceedings which
reduces the potential for producing justice.
haven't

the

ability to handle

fLQ

presentation of evidence is often haphazard,
uninformative.

§g

litigants'

rules of evidence,

thus the

incomplete, and

Litigants must make the difficult choice of

paying a la.wyer to represent them on small claims matters, or of
proceeding

~

se and hoping that the opponent has also chosen to

forego professional representation.
to assist RLQ se

Judges mayor may not choose

litigants with the presentation of cases;

litigants may therefore lose cases simply because they fail to
understand complex rules of procedure and evidence.
these

factors

leads to the

Virginia system of hearing

The sum of

inevitable conclusion that the
small claims fails

to provide a

satisfactory forum for these cases.
Proposals for a special small claims court in Virginia meet
the standard objections which await governmental expenditures in
a

state which is seemingly obsessed with minimizing budgets

regardless of

the

social costs.

Like the

"pay-as-you-go"

financing which held Virginia's highway development program
hostage until bond financing was approved recently, taxations'
perennial opponents' pat indignation at expenditures of any type
threatens the future of a

small claims court as well as the

rights of litigants suing on small claims.

While the creation of

a small claims court will cost money, cases heard there will save
docket time and costs in General District Court.

More important-

ly, marginal increases in expenditures on the Virginia court
system will

result

in major advances

in the protection and

vindication of the rights of citizens of this state.
Like the recent creation of Virginia's Intermediate Court of
Appeals, the adoption of a small claims court is well overdue.
While fiscal

responsibility

is a

proper

goal

for

the

state

legislature to pursue, such concerns are misguided when they
prevail at the expense of a fair and accessible justice system.
The citizens of Virginia hold the legislature responsible for
limiting expenditures of state tax dollars.

However, those same

citizens require that state judicial remedies be equally available

to all

citizens,

regardless of the size of the claim

involved or the claimant's ability to hire a lawyer.

A small

claims court in Virginia can provide fair hearings to claimants
with small disputes more fully than can the current General
District Court structure.

Despite the best efforts of competent

judges in the General District Courts, the system used in these
courts to hear small claims does not guarantee
cases.

justice in many

Although the current small claims system may produce some

injustices,

the

refusal

of a

powerful minority to allocate

resources for a more efficient and accessible small claims court
42

in fairness to the majority of citizens creates a much greater
injustice.
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